Scholars engage in extensive debate about the role of families and corporations in economic growth. Some propose that personal ties provide a mechanism for overcoming such transactions costs as asymmetrical information, while others regard familial connections as conduits for inefficiency, with the potential for nepotism, corruption and exploitation of other stakeholders. This empirical study is based on a unique panel dataset comprising all of the shareholders in a sample of early corporations, including information on such characteristics as gender, age, occupation, household composition, real estate holdings and personal wealth. Related investing was widespread among directors and elite shareholders, but was also pervasive among women and small shareholders. Personal ties were especially evident among ordinary investors in the newer, riskier ventures, and helped to ensure persistence in shareholding. "Outsider investors" were able to overcome a lack of experience and information by taking advantage of their own networks. The link between related investing and the concentration of ownership in these corporations suggests that this phenomenon was likely associated with a reduction in perceptions of risk, especially beneficial for capital mobilization in emerging ventures. These patterns are consistent with a more productive interpretation of related investing and its function in newly developing societies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Related investing refers to investors whose personal ties influence their decisions to enter or exit the market, the composition of their portfolios, or other actions that they might not otherwise undertake. Market efficiency is in part defined in terms of depersonalized transactions, so many analysts regard related investing as a sign of the existence of inefficiencies. Some claim that the exploitation of family networks offers a haven for potential redistributive or criminal activity.
Even if personalized interactions were initially prevalent because of productive reasons, it is commonly contended that such connections should tend to diminish in importance as financial markets and the economy matured. Most notably, Sir Henry Maine (1861) is frequently cited for his proposal that societies evolve from communal relationships based on status or ascribed ties, to contracting by autonomous actors. Thus, related investing is typically viewed as a temporary phenomenon, and its persistence is associated with anomalous deviations from optimality, or outright corruption. As the economy evolves, according to this perspective, one might expect that transactions costs would fall, and that a transition would occur towards the arguably more efficient state of depersonalized exchange.
This evolutionary assumption is evident in the work of John Majewski (1996) , who examined the financing of transportation infrastructure in the antebellum period, drawing on the experience of six railroad enterprises in Pennsylvania and Virginia. He found that early expansions in transportation networks were financed by local residents or small investors who were connected by ties of kinship and social capital or community spirit. Majewski argues that the development of the Southern economy was retarded by the continued involvement of local investors, whereas the Northeast expanded in part because its investments evolved away from the "friends and family" approach towards arms-length professional transactions. Others have raised 4 the possibility that, while relational investing might be productive in certain circumstances, such ties might be incompatible with efficiency within some organizational structures, and in corporations in particular. 1 In today's developing countries, a parallel extensive debate centers on the role of families and corporations in economic growth. La Porta et al., (1999) point out that family businesses are common in many parts of the world, and ownership in such firms is typically not dispersed.
Even though family ownership and control in business enterprise is pervasive, the scholarly discussion tends to be somewhat skeptical and pessimistic about the contributions of kinship groups. First, complementary institutions such as legal and political systems may be inefficient and inadequate to support the needs of the corporate form. Second, research points to problems in corporate governance, and the potential for the expropriation of shareholders by the groups that control the company. Minority shareholders and other outside stakeholders can be expropriated by such practices as nepotism and on-the-job consumption by entrenched family members. Outside investors face the risk that both internal and external control mechanisms may be too weak to protect them from "tunneling" or corruption in the firm. Acheson et al. (2016) study Victorian England, and conclude that the negative effect of family ownership depended on whether members of the group had control over the governance of the firm. A survey of the extensive literature on tunneling and malfeasance by families points out that the empirical context has been somewhat restricted, and calls for expansion of research to pay attention to other settings (Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar, and Andros Gregoriou 2010) .
Although agency costs may be magnified in the presence of kinship ties among the managers and leading shareholders, who can form blocks to transfer resources to themselves at 1 See Ingram and Lifschitz (2006) who argue that kinship ties allowed family firms to reduce the risk of bankruptcy, but that some types of relational governance conflicted with corporate modes of governance. 5 the expense of outsiders, groups with relational links can still generate net positive benefits.
Such benefits are especially evident in circumstances where institutional imperfections hinder market transactions. Family networks can facilitate remedies for market failure, such as investments in trust and social capital, the ability to monitor group members more effectively, cheaper enforcement mechanisms, and the use of reputation to reduce informational asymmetries. Relational contracts may result in stronger commitments or incentives to adhere to agreements. Although one might expect that such ties would tend to weaken over geographic or genetic distance, this is not necessarily the case. For instance, Avner Greif (2006) found that Maghrebi traders formed coalitions that enabled them to overcome obstacles to long distance trade. These private institutions functioned as commitment devices that enforced agreements and deterred opportunism among market participants.
Research on the corporate form of business organizations has tended to focus on the role of managers, directors, and other elite investors in the firm.
2 Naomi Lamoreaux (1996) , for instance, demonstrated the importance of "insider lending" in early U.S. capital markets. 3 She found that elite investors in banks tended to be related to each other, and these owners directed a significant fraction of the loans in the bank to other insiders. Rather than unproductive "tunneling," Lamoreaux finds that relational links in the banking sector were an effective means of mobilizing capital. Insider lending facilitated risky investments in venture capital for 2 A significant amount of research on the role of corporations in early American development has focused on issues in corporate governance (Bodenhorn 2012 , Dunlavy 2006 , Hilt 2008 . In particular, they examine ownership structures of the firms, and the causes and consequences of different voting rules. For instance, the charters of corporations sometimes specified graduated voting rights that reduced the degree of control exerted by the largest shareholders. Hilt analyzed the ownership structure of corporations in New York State in the 1820s, and concludes that minority shareholders were in danger of being "oppressed" by majority shareholders, but the latter were checked by corporate charters. Thus minority shareholders were granted disproportionate representation, and this reduced the cost of capital and enhanced diversification of portfolios. Bodenhorn similarly finds that graduated voting rules were prevalent in early American banks and were designed to attract small investors. 3 Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in Industrial New England, New York: Cambridge University Press (1996) . 6 innovative initiatives as industrialization got underway. Outsiders were quite aware that their stock purchases in the bank were destined to finance the other enterprises owned by the directors of the bank. They likely benefited from access to investment opportunities in new ventures, for the arrangement offered the uneducated investor the opportunity to gain enhanced profits beyond the banking sector, while diversification reduced risk. Insider lending comprised an efficient response to supply and demand, whereby outsiders were induced to make investments in the new industries of the day primarily because of their trust in the reputation and experience of the prominent families who founded the financial institutions. Familial and other social connections substituted for incomplete markets and helped to resolve problems that arose in the presence of such market imperfections as high risk and asymmetrical information.
The almost universal focus on the role of elite participants in the ownership of firms and corporations leaves open the question about whether relational connections were pervasive at all levels of business organization. If family ties were concentrated among elite investors, the implications for our understanding of the role of such ties would be different from the inference if these patterns were common to all investors of the time. Indeed, Naomi Tadmor (2001) rejects the conventional dichotomy between kinship circles and those who are unrelated, arguing that the family relationship is necessarily both affective and instrumental. However, little empirical research has been directed to the entire population of participants in the ownership and control of the firm, nor to the extent and implications of their heterogeneity. Most research tends to be at the firm level, although within-firm heterogeneity among owners can lead to significant unobserved variation which necessitates the analysis of the cadre of investors outside the managerial class. Such characteristics and patterns might have important implications for our understanding of the nature and consequences of kinship ties in economic development.
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Similarly, although the structure of ownership might be expected to vary over the life cycle of the firm and over time, the dynamics of firm ownership is still an understudied topic.
Kinship links are predicted to decline over time, but if they are found to have persisted during economic development in an effective institutional environment, then their existence is less likely to owe entirely to market imperfections. Helwege et al. (2007) examined how the ownership of insiders changed over time, and concluded that moral hazard and informational asymmetries were "irrelevant" to understanding changes in insider ownership. However, such research does not control for family relationships which, as discussed above, tend to be pervasive beyond the United States. The results confirm the conventional finding that corporate elites tended to be related to others within the firm. At the same time, nonelites, or the investors who were neither directors nor the largest shareholders, were also bound by kinship connections. Related investing was widespread among the ordinary investors, and seems to have been pervasive throughout the firm and the corporate economy, during the critical period of early industrialization. The universal nature of relational investing in these data suggests that further attention needs to be paid to the entire ownership structure and not just to the apex. Family ties were especially evident among the ordinary investors in emerging industries and in the newer, riskier investments, and may have played a role in inducing inexperienced investors to contribute to the venture capital of the period. The overall patterns are consistent with a more productive interpretation of related investing and its function in developing societies.
II. EARLY CORPORATIONS IN MAINE
From an international perspective, the corporate form of business enterprise has been prevalent in the United States to a far greater extent than in other countries. Unlike the general perspective from studies in developed economies at the present time, the conclusions from research in economic history tend to be more consistent with a favourable interpretation of the link between corporations and family holdings. Corporations developed rapidly, in tandem with deep and accessible financial markets in debt and equity. In the American colonies local and interstate debt contracting were extensive and functioned effectively from the earliest decades (Khan 2008 In New England, banks and insurance companies were the first types of corporations with diffuse ownership, and these enterprises attracted a diverse array of investors, including relatively risk-averse savers such as trustees, women and the elderly. Banks provided "saver education" that helped to inform new entrants in the market for corporate capital mobilization, and both firms and investors in subsequent transportation and manufacturing ventures were able to benefit from their example. In some instances, banks served as institutional investors which helped to fund emerging enterprises and industries. Prior research has investigated banking firms extensively, but a lack of systematic data has made it difficult to ascertain the extent to which their investors differed from those who funded the "venture capital" of the nineteenth century, and how these patterns varied over time. and almost one thousand mills were in operation by 1820. The proliferation of natural resources and cheap sources of power propelled manufacturing in the "take off" phase during the early nineteenth century. The area was remarkably rich in inventive inputs, and Maine inventors were among the most innovative and productive in the nation, accounting for a substantial fraction of the most valuable patents filed in the United States (Khan 2005) . By 1860 the economy was significantly diversified, the agricultural sector had shrunk to 40 percent, cotton manufacturing was the fifth highest in the country, and the state ranked ninth overall in U.S. manufacturing.
Some of the largest enterprises in the country were founded in Maine, and their average output, capital and employment in 1860 were exceeded only by firms in New York and Massachusetts (Bateman and Weiss, 1975) . Thus, the experience of this state in the antebellum period provides a useful case study of the nature of capital mobilization during early industrialization.
Maine granted charters to business enterprises through private acts of incorporation until 1875, after which general incorporation laws were passed, implying that the charter applications for all of the firms in this study were individually vetted and approved by the legislature. In 1839 and 1841 the statutes required all business corporations to record and publish the complete list of shareholders in the company, and this offers a unique opportunity to assess a panel of corporate owners during a period of rapid industrialization. 6 In 1845, 55 commercial enterprises were organized as corporations in Maine, with an average of 64 shareholders. The Portsmouth, Saco and Portland Railroad company was the largest firm in terms of the number of shareholders (255), whereas the York Manufacturing Corporation had the greatest total capitalization ($1,000,000). During the antebellum period the number of firms and the extent of capitalization expanded, and by 1855 the number of corporations had increased to 122 firms, with an average of 107 shareholders. The largest railroad firms were owned by some one thousand shareholders, and several corporations now had capital investments that exceeded a million dollars.
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The data set (Table 1) The names of stockholders were matched with the federal manuscript censuses in 1850 and 1860, which provided additional information on age, real estate and personal wealth, occupation, household composition, and marital status.
At the firm level, the charters that were granted at time of incorporation yielded additional information on the founding members of the company, governance rules, the initial capitalization, and stipulations about shareholder liability. 9 These corporate charters provided insights into restrictions on directors and officers of the corporation, voting rights, accounting 7 The Atlantic &St Lawrence Railroad had 1747 shareholders, and the Androscoggin & Kennebec Railroad had 1221 shareholders. The Portland, Saco & Portsmouth Railroad had grown to 958 shareholders. The Boston & Maine Railroad was capitalized at over four million dollars, firms with at least one million dollars included the Portland, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad, the York Manufacturing Corporation, and the Lewiston Water Power Company. 8 The sample includes data for 1840, but they are not included in the analysis for this paper because they comprise only banks. 9 Dick Sylla and Robert E. Wright generously provided access to their database of corporate charters in Maine, which supplemented the sample information on charters. The provisions of Maine corporate charters between 1840 and 1855 specified that the director should live in-state (40.4 % of all charters), directors had to be shareholders (37.4%), number of directors (72.5 %), officers had to give a bond (33.3%). Proxy voting was allowed in all cases, and graduated voting schemes were stipulated in 37.4 % of the charters, with only 2.9 % that allowed one vote per person (Carlson 2007 This section considers general patterns of shareholding during the antebellum period, and identifies the characteristics of safer, low-risk investments in the banking sector, relative to newer and riskier ventures in the incipient manufacturing industry and transportation enterprises.
Banking and securities markets have been well-researched, especially financial centers such as Boston, Philadelphia and New York, which were extensive and integrated by the end of the eighteenth century (Bodenhorn 2000 , Wright 2002 . Lamoreaux (1996) shows that, in terms of formal banking institutions, Maine was somewhat behind its Northeastern counterparts, but its per capita access to funds was on par with the national average. Significantly less research has been directed to the study of financial debt in "frontier regions," although empirical evidence does support the view that such markets were active and liquid from the earliest days of settlement in the American colonies (Khan, 2008) .
A key question for understanding the process and extent of capital mobilization is the geographical origins of investors. If shareholders reside in distant locations, it suggests that information is cheaply available, or else that mechanisms to reduce transactions costs exist.
Localization of adequate sources of funding, on the other hand, could point to a fairly sophisticated domestic financial system. Changes in these patterns over time offer insights into the evolution of capital markets. 14 It is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that manufacturing shares initially were primarily owned by investors from out of state. However, this percentage fell over time, and in the 1850s local residents accounted for the majority of the value of capital invested, indicating that they held larger average numbers of shares of the company than the nonresidents.
Transportation was a volatile and risky industry, with booms and waves of bankruptcies from turnpikes through railroads and the capital structure of transportation corporations similarly experiences a marked change over time. 10 Initially, out-of-state investors comprised almost two thirds of the shareholders, but in the 1850s this pattern is reversed, and there is a significant move towards local ownership of transportation corporations. These results are consistent with the view that, over the course of economic development, a process of "investor education" was underway. By the end of the antebellum era, Maine residents were adopting riskier portfolios, and in the process, they provided funding for the enterprises that would contribute to the course of industrialization and rapid economic growth that occurred during this period.
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Alexander Gerschenkron had pointed to the special role of banks in promoting economic development. Table 3 provides a useful perspective on the contribution of banks, bankers, and other financial sector transactors in funding the growth process. Banks themselves were owned by investors with links to finance, but these individuals accounted for only one third of bank shares. Instead, it is interesting to note that almost one quarter of bank shares were owned by investors with primary links to manufacturing, highlighting the symbiotic relationship which Lamoreaux (1996) had identified. Only 15 percent of shares in manufacturing enterprises were 10 It is not a coincidence that American bankruptcy law was closely tied to the experience of transportation corporations and, as Skeel (2001, p. 48 ) points out, "the history of corporate reorganization is the history of nineteenth-century railroad failure." 11 For a study of overall transportation patterns, see Wright and Murphy (2009) , showing some 7,000 private U.S. corporations had been chartered in the antebellum period to operate bridges, canals, ferries, railroads, and roads. Private capital investment accounted for a significant share of total domestic output; according to Klein and Majewski (2006) cumulative private sector investment in turnpikes between 1800 and 1830 in the New England and Middle Atlantic states likely comprised over six percent of 1830 GDP.
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owned by manufacturers, with 41.4 percent attributed to bankers and others in related occupations. 12 The role of manufacturers in capitalizing transportation networks is especially noteworthy. At the other end of the spectrum, artisans and farmers played a relatively minor role in securities markets throughout the economy, despite their prevalence in the population at large.
The table also brings to the fore the disproportionately high participation of professionals and white-collar workers in the financial underwriting of corporate enterprises in all three sectors. This group might have been expected to be more risk-averse than financiers and manufacturers, and to have been primarily attracted to the security and low risk of banking investments. Instead, only 14.9 percent of bank stocks were owned by white-collar workers.
Another striking result is that this class invested more in the manufacturing sector than shareholders whose occupation was in manufacturing (although obviously the table does not control for income levels), and comprised the largest proportion of the funders of transportation corporations. This finding is different from Majewski (1996) who argued that transportation improvements generated spillover benefits that encouraged farmers to pay for railroads and turnpikes, even if they were privately unprofitable. While manufacturers certainly benefited from internal improvements, it is unlikely that professional and white collar workers were motivated by such externalities. These results are inconsistent with those of such case studies as Majewski's, which found that few females invested in transportation stocks; instead, they suggest that women investors in the antebellum period may have been more similar to their male counterparts. Women were increasingly drawn into underwriting securities in riskier, newer ventures, in which it might be expected they would tend to have possessed little information or experience.
These patterns raise the question of the mechanisms that underlay investors' portfolio decision-making. Laurence (2008) argues that, in England, both the business of the bank and investments in the stock market occurred within the context of groups who were linked by kinship, religion, and other noneconomic ties. This is a plausible hypothesis but, again, such studies are limited to a few examples in a single industry. It would therefore be useful to examine the extent to which related investing was prevalent, not just in a single sector, but across the entire economy, and how these practices varied during the process of economic transformation. The next section investigates the role of family connections in the mobilization of capital during this period. The standard studies of kinship networks in an economic context tend to focus on corporate insiders, or officers who hold key managerial positions or directorships. Table 6 shows the prevalence of overall ownership and of related investing among such officers, The distribution of ownership concentration for overall corporate insiders is reflected in the patterns for related investors. In 1845 a third of all officers were related to another shareholder in the same firm, and this soon increased to over half of all insiders. Related investing was largely responsible for the increase in the influence of insiders in both banking and manufacturing corporations. In banks, related insiders initially owned 5.3 percent of total capital, and this jumped to 13.5 percent of capital by 1855. Similarly, manufacturing exhibited a sharp rise in the concentration of shares in the hands of related insiders, to 18 percent of the capitalization of these firms. In the case of transportation, the level and degree of concentration was significantly lower, since related inside investors owned no more than 3.6 percent of outstanding shares.
IV. RELATED INVESTING
Women were far more likely to share a surname with another investor in the same firm.
In some cases, their shares were inherited from male relatives. When the York Bank was first incorporated in 1831, its biggest shareholder was the wealthy 20 widow Sarah Cleaves, followed by her children, Mary and Daniel. 14 In 1845, after the death of their mother, Mary Cleaves became the majority shareholder, and owned 10 percent of the bank; whereas, her brother Daniel Cleaves was the second-largest shareholder, and served as the President of the bank from 1849 through 1865. However, even if they were active investors, it is impossible to determine whether these female related shareholders made decisions wholly independently, or whether they were following the advice of relatives with more financial experience. In any event, the general point is that, whether as active or passive investors, women were more likely to be involved in financial decisions as part of a family unit.
We can gain more insights into the characteristics of related investing if we exploit variation in investments across industries in terms of gender. Table 7 shows that the number of percent of female stockholders in railroads, turnpikes, bridges, and similar corporations were related to other investors in the same firm, significantly higher than the 50.7 percent in banks.
The lower prevalence of related investing in the stable banking industry, and the higher incidence in transportation suggests that kinship ties played a role in attenuating transactions costs in more venturesome enterprises. 15 In particular, it is likely that the burden of these transactions costs were disproportionately felt by women and other groups that were financially uneducated, less wealthy, or otherwise disadvantaged at equity investing.
The notion that related investing aided in the democratization of securities markets is supported by the kernel density distributions of related and unrelated investors, both in terms of the value of shareholding (Figure 3 ) and the amount of real estate wealth in their investment portfolio (Figure 4) . 16 Just as in the case of the kernel density estimate of the value of shares held, there is greater "heaping" for related investors at the lower tails of the distribution of real estate wealth, as well as in personal wealth (figure not included). The density estimates for the transportation corporations and other enterprises are noticeably skewed leftward for related investors, and to a greater extent than in the case of unrelated investors. This result suggests that the current tendency for researchers to focus almost exclusively on the kinship networks of elite investors is likely to miss what may be other crucial functions of related investing. Indeed, these distributions provide visual confirmation that kinship ties were especially relevant for small investors and individuals who were less wealthy.
What was the impact of related investing on ownership in the firm? The regressions in Table 8 examine the effects of related investing, ceteris paribus, on the shareholders' ownership stake in the firm, or the fraction of total shares that the individual holds. 17 The cross-tabulations had indicated that banks, manufacturing, and transportation corporations were characterized by different processes and outcomes. Diffuse ownership in these industries was also determined by 16 Kernel density estimation creates a hypothesized probability density function from the shareholder observations. A Gaussian density function was used as the kernel and nonparametric techniques were employed for the density estimation. 17 Regressions were also run that allowed the coefficients and intercepts to vary over each time period, and controlled for the size of the firm in terms of the number of stockholders, and for the age and location of the firm. These results confirmed that ownership by local Maine residents rose in each subsequent year. Shareholders in transportation held lower amounts of ownership rights initially, but by 1855 they owned significantly higher fractions of total equity in corporations. Related investing had grown over time, but the pattern was not due to the elite insiders in the firm, it was rather because of the higher percentage of shares held by the "outsider" related investors.
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varying factors. For instance, in banking and manufacturing, farming areas were associated with higher ownership concentration, but in transportation enterprises lower concentration occurred in more prosperous farming regions. For banks, older firms had lower concentration of shares, while the opposite was true of railroads. As one would expect, in all corporations directors and other officers owned larger fractions of shares, and this was especially true of manufacturing firms. The less advantaged shareholders, such as women investors, owned lower stakes in the banking and manufacturing enterprises, but they held larger proportions of equity in transportation. Directors in transportation held higher amounts of shares, but related investors were associated with concentration to an even greater extent. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that kinship networks encouraged their members to reduce perceived riskiness of investments. Related investing arguably promoted a democratization of capital mobilization during the early industrial period.
The regressions in Table 9 show the determinants of variation in "persistence," or the holding of shares in a company for more than five years. As might be expected, concentrated ownership (a higher fraction of equity held by an investor) was positively associated with persistence. Elite officers of the firm, such as the President, were also more likely to retain shares for longer periods, but occupation in general (such as white-collar status, or financial backgrounds) was not a significant explanatory factory. Women were more apt to hold shares for a shorter period, which is perhaps consistent with the notion of passive investing. Perhaps The current project employs a more extensive data set of shareholders and firms than has previously been available to reexamine the debate about related investing. The scope of coverage encompasses a period when the economy of Maine was undergoing rapid industrialization, and many of its corporations were leaders in the national sphere. It is generally agreed that Maine institutions were effective and transparent, and helped to promote technological change and economic growth. The results confirm that elite insiders, officers of the firm including treasurers, directors, and its presidents, were typically connected to other 24 shareholders in the corporation. These familial networks did not decline over time, instead, they increased as the economy developed. Moreover, it is striking that, when the analysis is extended to all shareholders in the firm, the same patterns are detected; outsiders were able to overcome a lack of experience and information by taking advantage of their own networks. As such, related investing seems to have been a universal feature of equity markets in the antebellum period.
This leads to the question of why kinship ties existed, not just among insiders, but also among outside shareholders. At least one implication is that, although insiders might attempt to use family networks to exploit other shareholders, their ability to tunnel is limited by the countervailing power of family networks among outsiders. Rather than seeking to expropriate their peers, related founders of Maine corporations introduced institutional mechanisms to ensure transparency, disclosure and monitoring of the financial and accounting status of the firm. Incorporations in Maine, New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the Antebellum Period Notes and Sources: Evans (1948) . Maine separated from Massachusetts to become an independent State in 1820. The comparison states were chosen because they all granted corporate charters through special acts of the legislature during the period under review, and changed to general incorporation in the 1870s (Maine, 1875; New Jersey, 1875; and Pennsylvania, 1873) . Notes and Sources: See text for sources of data set. Insiders are defined as all officers of the corporation who could be traced, including treasurers, directors, and presidents of the firm. Related insiders are those officers who share the same surname as another investor in the same enterprise. Notes and Sources: See text for sources of data set. Related investors share the same surname as another investor in the same enterprise. 
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Notes and Sources:
See text for sources of data set. Insiders are defined as all officers of the corporation who could be traced, including treasurers, directors, and presidents of the firm. Related investors/insiders are those shareholders/officers who share the same surname as another investor in the same enterprise. Established firms had been in existence for at least ten years. Closely held firms were owned by fewer than 20 shareholders. The excluded industry is banking. Population and farm value are estimated at the county level. Notes and Sources: See text for sources of data set. Persistence refers to shareholding for more than five years. Insiders are defined as all officers of the corporation who could be traced, including treasurers, directors, and presidents of the firm. Related investors/directors are those shareholders/officers who share the same surname as another investor in the same enterprise. The excluded industry is banking.
